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Abstract
Childcare availability is regarded as an important factor in the evaluation of
public policies for both sustaining fertility and increasing women participation
to the labour market. However, the recent empirical literature shows that the
extension of the public supply of childcare mainly crowds out private providers.
Italy is a case of special interest for testing the relationship between the pub-
lic and private supply of childcare given that: 1) an increase in public childcare
provision can be achieved through broadly conceived forms of out-sourcing; 2)
public childcare for children less than 3 years old can be considered as a ser-
vice with high redistributive goals, which determines a sorting mechanism of the
demand between public and private providers. We use Italian data at the munic-
ipality level for the period 2000-2006 to explain the number of registered private
providers of childcare as a function of 1) the public coverage of the 0-2 years old
population, and 2) the main characteristics of the public service. We show that
the public coverage positively a⁄ects the number of private providers. When the
characteristics of public supply are considered, the e⁄ect of a sorting mechanism
is con￿rmed.
JEL classi￿cation: H44, H53, H75, H77
Keywords: Child Care, Italian Municipalities, Private-Public Mix
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11 Introduction
Childcare availability is regarded as an important factor in the evaluation of public
policies for both sustaining the fertility and increasing women participation in the
labour market. As a consequence the EU set out speci￿c targets in terms of population
coverage to be full￿lled by 2010: the Lisbon 2000 summit set a 33% coverage rate for
0-2 residents (or younger than 3), and a 90% target for the pre-schooling population.
Recent statistics show that the two subsets of children receive very di⁄erent levels
of services across countries (OECD 2007) (￿g.1): in general, the coverage levels for
children younger than 3 are substantially lower. In some countries, such as Italy, the
low coverage level is regarded as one of the main causes for low women participation
rates to the labour market and it has been argued that an increase in public supply
could be an e⁄ective tool to address this issue (Del Boca 2002; Del Boca et al. 2005).
However, the recent empirical literature, following quasi experimental approaches,
shows that an expansion of public spending and public provision of childcare crowds out
private providers (or other informal childcare) with an insigni￿cant impact on women
participation rates to the labour forces (Baker et al. 2008; Havnes and Mogstad 2009).
The basic intuition is that the crowding out mechanisms takes place because of a sub-
stitution e⁄ect from the users￿point of view: the two providers are substitutes in terms
of the service characteristics except for the price. The subsidization level for public
childcare users (i.e. lower fees for the same service) has been addressed by recent stud-
ies as the primary reason of an excess of demand for public providers (Wrohlich 2008;
Ban￿et al. 2009). The e⁄ect has been detected within institutional frameworks where
private and public providers are juxtaposed, that is to say the public sector does not
rely on private providers to supply the service.
Within the large literature on the private-public interactions with reference to local
public services, Italy is a case of special interest for testing the impact of the public
provision on the private supply of childcare for several reasons. First of all, an increase
in public childcare provision can be achieved through both the building of new facilities
and to broadly de￿ned out-sourcing mechanisms (e.g. reserved seats in private crŁches,
public crŁches run by external providers etc.). Secondly, access to the public crŁches
can be set according to redistributive goals, determining a sorting mechanism of the
users￿demand between public and private providers. In other words, municipalities
typically enforce speci￿c local welfare policies placing the facilities￿slots according to
"access criteria" which weigh social and economic conditions of distress more than
work and family reconciliation goals. This is apparent in the method used to calculate
fees which is based on an indexed income (ISEE)1: in general the public service is
highly convenient in terms of price only for low-income percipients, whereas, as income
increases, the private alternative can be equivalent in term of users￿costs2.
1Sometimes ISEE income is used as a priority criteria when candidates have equal scores. ISEE=
(family income+ 20% family property)/weighing parameter.
2Since 2005 an independent organization (Cittadinanza Attiva 2006-2008) has been running an
yearly based survey to monitor the prices of public facilities. The survey calculates the fees for an
2We test the relationship between private and public childcare3 using two unique
datasets at the municipal level. The ￿rst dataset is based on the register used by the
Board of Trade of Milan. The register contains the total number of ￿rms that provide
private crŁches from 2000 to the present: registration is compulsory for ￿rms involved
in this service. The data are recorded at the municipal level; although they could
underestimate the private childcare (e.g. one ￿rm can run more than one facility),
they represent the only available o¢ cial source4. The second dataset is based on the
budget grids of Italian Municipalities (available through the Italian Ministry of the
Interior), which provides information on the public crŁches run by the municipalities.
The latter dataset has been integrated with additional information on the years 2000-
2006. We ended up with two samples of municipalities: the ￿rst sample containes an
unbalanced panel of around 700 municipalities with a resident population larger than
10,000 inhabitants; the second sample consists of 144 larger municipalities (capoluogo di
provincia), which were contacted between November 2008 and February 2009 in order
to get their access criteria, average opening hours, and the ￿ exibility of the service
supply (broadly de￿ned as users￿ s options).
Using count data analysis, we explain the number of ￿rms providing private child-
care as a function of 1) childcare public coverage for the larger sample, and 2) the main
features of the public service for the smaller sample. Results show that private and
public suppliers coexist only when the level of public coverage is considered, thus an-
swering to di⁄erent kind of users￿preferences. When we control for the characteristics
of the public service related to potential competitive elements with the private sector
(i.e. opening hours), a displacement e⁄ect can take place for users indi⁄erent towards
the two providers. However, if the speci￿c local welfare policies (i.e. access criteria)
are evaluated, di⁄erent demand functions seem to operate in relation with the provider
nature.
The paper is organized as follows. In the ￿rst part, we presents the institutional
framework and the main elements of the Italian public childcare provision. In the
second part the methodology is explained and results of the empirical analysis adopted
on the two samples are presented.
2 The Italian Case Study
In Italy, like in other unitary-but-decentralized states, childcare public policy develops
at both central and local level of government. The State determines the essential levels
ideal typo of family: two working parents with a single child under 3, with a family gross income
equal to 44.200 (ISEE income= 19,000 euro) the median price of a month in the Italian larger cities
(capoluoghi di provincia) for the school year 2006/07 was around 300 euro. It is di¢ cult to develop
more in depth analysis on this point given that more simulations are needed and there is no possibility
to compare potential results with data from the private sector, which are lacking at the moment.
3From now on we use childcare as referring to crŁches services.
4A recent survey of the Bank of Italy has tried to reconstruct a dataset on private and public crØches
with data from 57 municipalities (Zollino 2010, 173).
3of performances (LEP)5, i.e. the minimum level of supply for public childcare could
be set equal to the 33% of the resident 0-3 population, and is in charge of the ex post
monitoring of the policy enforcement. Municipalities handle the direct provision of local
services.
The normative framework developed in the course of time has in part modi￿ed the
original view on the nature of childcare service. The ￿rst law introducing crŁches in
the Italian system (Law n. 1044/1972) de￿ned crŁches as "a social service of public
interest aimed at the temporary care of children in support of work-family responsi-
bilities and promoting female participation in the labour market". The CrŁche Law
created a Special Fund to ￿nance the building and management of 3,800 crŁches from
1972 to 1976. Changes in the Italian socio-economic scenario during the following years
created an excess in the demand for childcare with respect to the available supply. In
order to cope with the increase in demand, the law 285/ 1997 law raises the childcare
supply by diversifying the types of services available to meet existing demand. The
law aims also to promote, among other things, additional services (with educational
and ludic goals) for childhood, which are di⁄erent from crŁches because of their greater
(organizational) ￿ exibility (e.g. they might be family run) and shorter opening hours.
these additional services are generally known as baby parking, micro-crŁches or fam-
ily baby sitters funded by the municipalities as alternative solutions to traditional day
care. Additionally, as of 2003-04, crŁches in the working places also started to provide
extra supply, especially in Northern regions (Landuzzi 2005). Nowadays it is possible
to de￿ne the Italian childcare system as a mixed system. While for several realities it
stands mainly public, it is more and more common to ￿nd agreements between munic-
ipalities and private providers: the municipalities can "book" a certain number of slots
in private facilities, they can pay part of the fees for users of private slots, or they can
allow for private providers to manage part of their supply while the access to and the
price of the service stands under the public administration control.
Generally speaking, crŁches can be regarded either as social services or as a part of
an educational track. The latter is the basic feature of pre-schooling while the former
sticks quite strongly to services for younger children. From the users viewpoint, if
childcare does not belong to an educational track it might not be regarded as a proper
substitute compared to informal childcare solutions (e.g. baby sitting, relatives, etc.).
From the local administration viewpoint, the social service nature of childcare can be
interpreted as a tool that can be used either to purse social integration and cope with
economic distress (redistribution at the local level) or to reconcile work and parenthood.
5The ￿rst ￿scal federalist reform (2001) and the most recent one (2009) have stressed the necessity
to introduce minimum levels of public services (in quantitative terms), but so far the e⁄orts￿success
has been jeopardized by a sort of institutional inability to de￿ne clear intergovernmental relationships
and the wanted targets (Ambrosanio et al. 2009).
42.1 Access Criteria
The criteria to regulate the access to public slots are often very strict: according to
the said criteria an absolute priority is given to applications of children with handicap,
a consequence of the 1992 national legislation on this issue. Other than that, each
administration establishes a list of criteria, which seldom make it di¢ cult for a family
made up of two working parents without any speci￿c problems to get their application
accepted.
We obtained information on the access criteria for 144 municipalities with uniform
distribution across the country:100 administrations use cardinal criteria (i.e. a score is
given to each entry), 22 municipalities use ordinal criteria that only provide priorities,
and 22 do not use any criteria regulating the access to the service in a total discretional
way. The access criteria di⁄er from one city to the next, but there is a common
core: for example, working parents, parents with temporary work, characteristics of
the parent jobs or parents￿physical or psychological conditions. To make the analysis
easier, we have reclassi￿ed the adopted criteria into 21 homogeneous categories (tab.1):
10 categories are related to the family-work reconciliation and 11 stand for social and
economic distress of either the child or the child￿ s family. The 1992 national legislation
has not be considered as a distinctive criterion, since it equally a⁄ects the entire set of
municipalities.
Let xi (i=1, 2...10) be the scores given by the municipalities to the ￿rst 10 cate-
gories; the scores of the remaining 11 categories is indicated by yj, (j=1,2...11). Start-
ing from these two sets of homogeneous criteria, we calculate the weight that each local


































WF represents the index of the work-family reconciliation (WF) for municipality k,
and it is the ratio of total scores for the 10 WF categories to the total score given by
the 21 categories6. The index Ik
SEU is calculated analogously. Normalizing allows us
6The score a child application should get if it would have all the recalled characteristics considered
by that municipality.
5to compare the indexes of di⁄erent units and, consequently, to understand whether the
local government conceives of the childcare service mainly as an instrument to reconcile
work and family responsibilities rather than a pure social service aiming for social
inclusion and/or social integration of children coming from a stressful environment.
The Ik
WF index is dominant (Ik
WF > 0:5) only for 13.19% of the municipalities
included in the sample, while the 56.24% of them considers the Ik
SEU index as the main
indicator to prioritize the access (Ik
SEU > 0:5)7:The choice to weigh more one rather
than the other component can in turn be a⁄ected by the social and cultural background
of the local community as well as the preferences for redistribution. All in all, there
seems to be no signi￿cant di⁄erence through the Italian macro areas: municipalities
tend to conceive of childcare as a tool to provide assistance towards social integration
and in kind redistribution.
From a local ￿nance point of view, this characterization can a⁄ect the funding of the
service in terms of users￿fees. The way in which fees are calculated rely on a calculation
of the income which includes a patrimonial component and weighs the characteristics
of the family (ISEE). The lower is the so-derived income the lower the contribution
required to the user the higher the redistribution.
3 Methodology
Since the dependent variable represents a count of events, the number of private ￿rms,
we can try to assess the impact of public coverage and public supply characteristics
on the private market using Poisson and negative binomial models. In the Poisson
model the probability of an event occurring ￿ is constant during a period of time and
proportional to the duration of time (Jones 2000). Its probability mass function is equal
to





where ￿ is the intensity parameter. However, the Poisson model rely on the so-called
equidispersion property that can rarely holds in real data, given that it means (Cameron
and Trivedi 2009)
E(Y ) = V ar(Y ) = ￿ = exp(x
0￿) (4)
When equidispersion does not hold, we have to deal with overdispersion and excess
of zeros problems. Consider the distribution of the number of registered private ￿rms
in the two samples we use. In the ￿rst larger sample 81.18% of the observations have no
registered ￿rms (i.e. zero events), while only 1.34% of the observations have more than
10 ￿rms. The skeweness of the distribution looks milder for the second smaller dataset,
7We are considering the municipalities using cardinal criteria. They represent the 69.43% of the
total sample (144 cities)
6where even if a large proportion of units counts zero, the majority of the observations
are associated to municipalities with a positive number of ￿rms (tab.2). Excess of zeros
are generally related to heterogeneity at the unit level (municipalities): there might be
some unobserved characteristics which makes more probable to have private providers
in some municipalities rather than others.
To take into account unobservable heterogeneity we could either use a Poisson model
where only the mean is assumed to be correctly speci￿ed, E(yjx) = exp(x0￿), and the
equivariance assumption is released using a robust (sandwich) covariance matrix (Pois-
son Maximum Likelihood)(Greene 2008) or a negative binomial model (NB), which con-
trols for overdispersion assuming that the individual error term comes from a particular
distribution. As a matter of fact, the NB model is based on a probability mass func-
tion, which de￿nes the intensity parameter as in the Poisson model, while an additional
parameter, ￿, is inserted to model the overdispersion as follows












E(Y ) = ￿ and V ar(Y ) = ￿ + ￿￿
2￿k (6)
When ￿ = 0, the NB model becomes a Poisson model. If k=1 we have NB1
models, where the variance is proportional to the mean, whereas if k=0 we have NB2
models where the variance is a quadratic function of the mean (Jones 2000). The latter
speci￿cation is regarded as a very good approximation to a more general variance
function (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). Hence, we use the NB2 speci￿cation in addition
to the Poisson model with robust standard errors.
4 Explaining the Public-Private Mix
4.1 The Role of the Public Supply
The larger sample allows to address the general trend of both the private ￿rms and the
public coverage. During the considered time span (2000-2006) the number of private
registered ￿rms (on average per municipality per macro area) increased almost by 250%
in the North West, 84% in the North East, 171% in the Center, 176% in the Southern
part of the country. Checking how many municipalities are represented in the register
between 2000 and 2006, a considerable increase can be detected especially in North
Western regions (+541%) followed by Central Regions (+407%), the South (+270%),
and ￿nally the North East (+244%) (￿g.2).
The trend in the supply in publicly provided seats is much smoother with the South
and the Islands experiencing a dramatically understated supply level. In 2006 the
available slots per 0-2 residents (so called public coverage) show a remarkable distance
of the South from the rest of the other macro areas: 9% of coverage against the 14%
of the Center, the 13% of North West, and the 17% of the North East area (2006
7values) (tab.3). The average public coverage of the entire dataset is around a 13% of
the resident population (tab.7).
Finally, the management form can be a relevant component in order to get a better
understanding of the interaction between public and private sector: public or not-public
governance (e.g. private managing with the municipality participation/cost sharing
etc.) are the adopted solutions by the local administrations. Non-direct public man-
agement prevails in smaller municipalities (<10,000) (Antonelli and Grembi 2009)8,
while direct public management tends to prevail as the municipality size increases.
From the 2000 to the 2006, Italian municipalities switched from a direct management
to some sort of outsourcing, with stronger variations for the North East (-15.5%) and
the North West (-12.5%) (tab.4)9.
We run separate regressions using both Poisson with robust (sandwich) standard
errors and negative binomial regression (NB2) in a linear-log speci￿cation for pooled
data. For each approach we run two sets of regressions whether or not the provincial
unemployment female rate is included. In fact, data on female unemployment rate
are missing at the municipal level but for the census 2001 data. Therefore we use the
provincial level which gives the ￿ avour of the market conditions for women in the area:
higher level of unemployment should a⁄ect negatively the presence of private providers.
However this correlation could be captured by the average taxable income (the higher
the income, the higher the dimension of the private sector), which is considered as
well. We control for the municipality size using the resident population and its square,
given that this allows for introducing characteristics of the population not otherwise
available at the municipality level such as the educational level. As matter of fact
the correlation between municipality size and percentage of higher degree (graduates)
residents is equal to 0.98 (2001 census data). The demographic composition of the
resident population is taken into account using the proportion of old people (older
than 65) on the total resident population. The higher the old people quota the lower
the incentives for private investors to open structures pointed to younger and working
people. Finally, we take into account possible interactions between public and private
sectors, given by the governance of the public crŁches. If the municipality runs the
facilities mainly through a non-direct (public) management, this could a⁄ect positively
the presence of private ￿rms providing the service. The reverse should be true if the
management is direct. However, using the management dummy in the larger sample
we could capture also some of the features of the public service for which we cannot
control otherwise (e.g. access criteria). If this is the case, a direct-public management,
for instance, might de￿ne municipalities more concerned of redistributive issues.
Regressions￿results show that the public coverage has a positive impact on the
8Which cannot a⁄ord to directly provide this expensive service.
9As assessed in a previous work by Fazioli and Filippini (1997) on a sample of Italian municipal-
ities, forms of out-sourcing seem to diminish the variable cost of providing the service even for those
municipalities in which the service continues to be run from the public sector. This is due to the fact
that alternative forms of governance allow to have references in terms of performance and employment
of the workers not available when the service is only run entirely at the public level.
8number of registered private ￿rms (tab.5): an increase of 1% of public coverage is
associated to a statistically signi￿cant increase in the number of registered private
￿rms in a range between 0.18 and 0.26. NB2 regressions estimate a higher impact
than Poisson speci￿cations (tab.6). The positive correlation addresses a phenomenon
of coexistence of the two sectors rather than of displacement or substitution. The
interpretation of the management coe¢ cient seems to capture the nature of the service
as far as the public sector is concerned: when the management is run directly this a⁄ects
positively the number of registered private ￿rms. We go in depth to this intuition with
the second analyzed sample. In terms of predicted probability the NB2 model seems
to perform slightly better, given an overdispersion parameter of 0.67-0.64 (tab. 5),
predicting the probability to have zero registered ￿rms in the 80% of the time against
the 77% of the Poisson case, when the actual zero observation are equal to 81%.
4.2 The Role of the Public Supply Characteristics
For a second sample made by 144 larger municipalities, we recollected more detailed
information regarding the main characteristics of the public childcare provision in terms
of access criteria, average opening time, and supply complexity. The goal of the present
analysis is to deal with both the conceptual framework within which the service is
delivered by the public and its potential competitive characteristics with the private
sector. The 44% of the municipalities included in this sample weighs more than 60%
the applicants￿socio and economic distress, when applications need to be prioritized
according to the access criteria (seu) (tab.8).The majority of municipalities with such
score are placed in the Center and the South and the Islands. We expect that the
more the service is conceived as a local welfare tool for social inclusion and/or social
integration of children coming from stressful environments the higher the number of
private ￿rms. If this is con￿rmed, the priorization of applicants on the base of so
de￿ned access criteria sorts the demand in a twofold way: 1) people with low scores
according to the social access criteria tend to direct their demand to the private sector,
and 2) the choice for an alternative private solution can be guided by the parents￿
concern of a peer e⁄ect.
We control for the characteristics of the public supply, which can de￿ne a measure of
competition with the private sector, using a complexity index and the average opening
time. To de￿ne complexity we count the options given to applicants in the application
papers: there may be just a single option (i.e. leave the child from 8.00 a.m. to 2 p.m.)
up to 7 options (e.g. part-time, full-time, Saturday morning, full time early entrance
etc.). More than 2 options are generally given to municipalities other than Southern and
the average complexity of the sample is equal to 2.2 (tab.9). An approximation of the
opening time is provided by the information on the average openings at the municipal
level (e.g. the overall public childcare structure provides a certain amount of hours
per day in a municipality). The average opening time is around 7.5 hours, with the
majority of Southern cities o⁄ering part time solutions (on average 6 hours)(tab.10).
Longer opening hours and more available users￿options for public slots should a⁄ect
9negatively the number of registered private ￿rms.
Once the main characteristics of the public service are taken into account the row
measure for public service, the coverage, losses most of its signi￿cance (tab.11). In
fact, the characteristics coe¢ cient have the expected signs: regarding the competitive
features the average opening time plays a more crucial role than the supply complexity.
The access criteria (seu) are positively correlated with the number of private ￿rms. The
complete set of extra information absorbs both the e⁄ect played in the ￿rst dataset
from the public coverage and the management form10. The di⁄erence in estimation
performance between the NB2 and the Poisson robust model is detectable even for this
sample, but the overdispersion problem looks-as stated- signi￿cantly smaller (around
0.24).
5 Concluding remarks
The relationship between the private and the public sector as far as childcare is con-
cerned is generally addressed by the literature in mutually exclusive terms: an increase
in highly subsidized public service should crowd out private providers, being the two
services equivalent in everything else but the users￿copayment quota. In Italy, sev-
eral di⁄erences can be addressed between private and public providers ￿rst of all in
terms of access opportunities. Whereas, many empirical evaluations of the relationship
between private and public suppliers come from countries where the rationing of the
public provisions is basically enforced through slots undersupply, in Italy public crŁches
are also rationed through access criteria and redistributive price settings. Additionally
private providers are sometimes directly involved by the municipalities in the provision
of slots on behalf of the public sector, which might be equally unusual in the experience
of other countries. Controlling for the management form and other characteristics at
the municipal level, we detect a positive impact that the public coverage has on the
number of private providers. When the operational elements of the public supply and
the access criteria are considered, a more competitive running of the service (i.e. longer
opening hours) make the public provider an alternative to the private sector.
A more in depth investigation would require data on the coverage of private providers-
number of slots per children- as well as information on private crŁches on the workplace.
However this ￿rst step shows that interactions at the local level in terms of private-
public mix is a quite rooted when local public services are analyzed. In this sense,
an extension of public coverage would probably determine a change in the number of
private providers the direction of which depends on the welfare policies enhanced by
the municipalities.
10Which turns out to be negative consistently with the fact that a publicly run public childcare a⁄ect
negatively the number of private supplier.Yet it is not signi￿cant, meaning that the decision to operate
in the sector as a private is not mainly determine by the governance statute of the public sector.
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Figure 1. Source: OECD Family Databasee and OECD Education Dataset
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Unemployed and single parent
Part time work-
ing parents
Social distress of the family
Communiting Speci￿c Parental Problems
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14Municipalities with registered childcare services































15Table 2: Frequency distribution of registered private childcare
registered Entire Dataset 144 Municipalities
private childcare freq. percent freq. percent
0 4,043 81.18 231 23.72
1 371 7.45 214 21.97
2 160 3.21 137 14.07
3 123 2.47 115 11.81
4 79 1.59 74 7.6
5 35 0.7 34 3.49
6 42 0.84 42 4.31
7 31 0.62 31 3.18
8 20 0.4 20 2.05
9 10 0.2 10 1.03
10 66 1.34 66 6.77
Table 3: Average Public Coverage
Macro Area 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
North West 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
North East 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16
Center 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13
South and Islands 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08
Italy 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Municipalities 652 658 670 667 697 704 698 4746
Table 4: The management of the public childcare
Macro Area 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
North West 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.82
North East 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.71 0.78
Center 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.73
South and Islands 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.80
Italy 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.79
Municipalities 676 687 689 679 702 703 692 4828
16Table 5: Entire sample regression results
VARIABLES Poisson NBREG
1 2 1 2
Public Coverage 0.26*** 0.24** 0.31*** 0.31***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Income 1.95*** 2.09*** 1.31*** 1.36***
(0.35) (0.38) (0.32) (0.36)
Proportion of Old -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.13 -0.07
(0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24)
Resident Population 9.25*** 9.91*** 9.90*** 11.11***
(0.46) (0.49) (0.48) (0.52)
Resident Population Squared -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.41***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Management 0.06 0.08 0.17* 0.21*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Female Provincial Unemployment -0.05 -0.14
(0.13) (0.13)
Constant -79.98*** -85.60*** -77.01*** -84.74***




Macro Area Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4577 3952 4577 3952
pseudo-R-squared 0.63 0.66 0.29 0.31
log likelihood -3179 -2696 -2906 -2441
Wald chi2 3591 3296 2924 2667
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Robust standard errors in parentheses
17Table 6: Marginal E⁄ects (entire sample)
VARIABLES Poisson NBREG
1 2 1 2
Public Coverage 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.26
Income 1.42 1.62 0.98 1.13
Proportion of Old -0.52 -0.58 -0.09 -0.06
Resident Population 6.7 7.67 7.42 9.24
Resident Population Squared -0.25 -0.28 -0.27 -0.34
Management 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.2








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 202 139 150 235 726
1 35 40 83 90 248
Total 237 179 233 325 974
Regressions: 144 municipalities
20Table 9: Complexity
complexity North West North East Center South and Total
Island
1 7 42 63 237 349
2 63 48 76 61 248
3 90 62 54 20 226
4 49 27 21 7 104
5 7 0 14 0 21
6 7 0 0 0 7
7 7 0 0 0 7
Total 230 179 228 325 962
Table 10: Average opening time in public childcare
avopentime North West North East Center South and Total
Island
6.0 0 0 7 235 242
6.5 7 20 7 0 34
7.0 49 55 21 14 139
7.5 69 42 68 7 186
8.0 56 35 70 27 188
8.5 7 0 13 14 34
9.0 28 13 35 14 90
10.0 14 14 7 14 49
Total 230 179 228 325 962
21Table 11: 144 sample regression results
VARIABLES Poisson NBREG
1 2 1 2
Public Coverage 0.13 0.10 0.16** 0.12
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Income 1.81*** 1.80*** 1.07** 1.08**
(0.37) (0.39) (0.33) (0.34)
Proportion of Old -0.99*** -0.99*** -1.04*** -1.05***
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25)
Resident Population 4.08*** 3.95*** 3.74*** 3.48***
(0.57) (0.59) (0.59) (0.61)
Resident Population Squared -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Complexity -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Average Opening Time -0.91** -0.89** -0.72** -0.69**
(0.28) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25)
Seu 0.12* 0.13* 0.07 0.08
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Management -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Female Provincial Unemployment -0.14 -0.20
(0.11) (0.11)
Constant -44.04*** -43.11*** -35.20*** -33.65***




Macro Area Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 920 790 920 790
pseudo-R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.18 0.17
log likelihood -1882 -1692 -1771 -1587
Wald chi2 1392 1270 1134 1012
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Robust standard errors in parentheses
22Table 12: Marginal E⁄ects (144 sample)
VARIABLES Poisson NBREG
1 2 1 2
Public Coverage 0.44 0.37 0.54 0.45
Income 6.05 6.61 3.50 3.89
Proportion of Old -3.32 -3.64 -3.42 -3.78
Resident Population 13.63 14.52 12.24 12.56
Resident Population Squared -0.46 -0.49 -0.41 -0.41
Complexity -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 -0.26
Average Opening Time -3.03 -3.28 -2.36 -2.50
Seu 0.44 0.52 0.24 0.31
Management -0.09 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02
Female Provincial Unemployment -0.51 -0.73
Table 13: Variables De￿nition
Source: Italian Ministry of the Interior
Seats Public available slots per younger than 3 resi-
dents
Management Dummy=1 if direct municipal management, 0
otherwise
Income Per Capita Average Taxable Income
Source: Italian National Institute of Statistic (ISTAT)
Old Residents over 65 years old out of the total res-
ident population (Years 1997-2005)
Fem Unem Prov Female unemployment rate at the provincial
level (Years 1997-2005)
Municipality Size Resident population (Years 1998-2006)
Source: Municipalities (Our Surveys)
Seu Dummy= 1 if the Municipality weights socio
and economic uneasiness above 0.6, 0 otherwise
Complexity Dummy=1 if the number of options associated
to the crŁches supply is above the average (2), 0
otherwise
Average Opening Municipal average opening time of public facili-
ties
23